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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-THE FLORIDA
AUTOMOBILE CASES
INTRODUCTION
The concept of the search warrant and the federal and state con-
stitutional provisions dealing with search and seizure arc basic and
fundamental American law.' Two centuries ago, the Wilkes case2 and the
words of James Otis3 denouncing the Writs of Assistance 4 played a large
part in precipitating the American Revolution. To insure against the
reoccurrence of government sanctioned unreasonable searches and seizures,
prohibition of such searches and seizures was embodied in one of the
articles of the Bill of Rights.5  The maxim "every man's home is his
castle" has been so thoroughly ingrained in American and Anglo-Saxon
law and thought as to be almost axiomatic]
And yet, despite its apparent force and weight, a single Chicago
court recorded 4,593 violations of this right in a single year.8 The task
of teaching the law enforcement officer the great value of guarding and
preserving this civil liberty seems an almost impossible one. His eagerness
to convict the guilty apparently leaves little room for consideration of
1. Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is guaranteed in the federal
and all state constitutions. For a collection of these provisions, see CORNELIUS, SEARcH
AND SEIZURE 9-12 (1926).
The Florida and federal provisions are set out in notes 11 and 12 infra.
2. Wilkes v. Wood. 3 Geo. 3, 19 St. Tr. 1153 (1763). See also Etnick v.
Carrington, 6 Geo. 3, 19 St. Tr. 1030 (1765). The decisions rendered in these two
cases are set out and noted in Bloosr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-623 (1866).
A lengthy discussion of these cases and the related background material may
be found in 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 610-17 (8th ed., Carrington
1927). See also CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 12-18 (1926); MACHEN, IHE LAW
of SEARCH AND SEIZURE Xi (1950).
Further history of the Fourth Amendment may be found in 2 STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON TIlE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1902 (3d ed. 1858).
3. See the text material cited in note 2 supra. See also note 4 infra.
4. These writs empowered revenue officers, in their discretion, to search suspected
places for smuggled goods and to seize such goods if found. They were termed by
James Otis to be the "worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of English law, that ever was found in
an English law book." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-25 (1885).
5. U.S. CONST. Amend. TV.
6. Nemo de domo sui extrahi debet. BROom, LEGAL MAxIMs 321-29 (6th
Amer. ed. 1868).
7. This phrase has been employed by courts and writers innumerable times. Its
acceptance and adoption seems almost unaninous. E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Wilson v. State, 30 Fla. 234, 253, 11 So. 556, 561
(1892)(". . . (O)ne's home is the castle of defense for himself and his family.").
1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 611, quotes the words of Chatham in defense
of this proposition, "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through
it; the rains may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his forces dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."
8. See Note, The State Exclusionary Rule as a Deterrent Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 45 J. CRItm. L., C. & P.S. 697 (1954-55).
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the legality and propriety of the means used to achieve his end. For,
in practice, it is usually the guilty who benefit from this right.9
In recent decades, Prohibition and the use of the automobile to
transport contraband created a new difficulty in the application of the
established law.' Courts were compelled to determine what rules were
to be applied to the search of automobiles and the seizure of their
contents. Was a warrant necessary? If not, what was required? What
exceptions were to be made to existing law? What standards and criteria
were to be employed?
Three decades of decision, change, and innovation seem to have
answered most of these questions. In this comment, the law of search
and seizure in Florida will be presented, as will be those few questions
and problems which seem, as yet, unanswered and unsolved.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN GENERAL
The right of citizens to have their persons, houses, and effects secured
against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by both the
Florida" and federal' 2 constitutions. Although the Fourth Amendment
affects neither the proceedings of state courts nor the actions of state
officers,' 3 statements of the Florida court as to the weight to be afforded
federal interpretations of this guarantee make the discussion of certain
9. "it is oftimes better that crimes should go unpunished then that citizens
should be liable to have their premises invaded ..... " De Lancy v. City of Miami.
43 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla. 1954). See the separate dissents of Justices Frankfurter and
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 484 (1928)(Frankfurter, J.,
stated ". . . I think it less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." Brandeis. J., stated "The confirmed criminal
is as much entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow citizen ....").
See also ibid ("... (T)he victims of illegal searches are usually law breakers.").
In speaking of this situation, one author noted that "violators of the law find themselves
undeserving beneficiaries of a roundabout technique supposed to make police and
prosecutors mend their ways." MACnUIE, EvrnrENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON
LAw 125 (1947).
10. See MACHEN, op. cit. smpra note 2, at 48, "The rank lawlessness of the
prohibition era in general, and the flagrant violation of liquor laws with the use of
modern automobiles, airplanes and high speed boats in particular became the exception
for recognizing the newly developed necessity for making an exceptional case of the
moving vehicle." This problem is further discussed in BLAKEMORE, NATIONAL PRO-
IBITIor 475-76 (1925). See also note 8 suira.
11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not he
violated and no warrants issued, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be
searched, and thing or things to be seized. FLA. CoNsT. D. R. § 22.
12. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CoNsT. Amend. IV.
It should be noted that, with the exception of minor differences in phraseology
and punctuation, the Florida and federal provisions are identical.
13. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See also Boynton v. State, 64 So.2d
536 (Fla. 1953).
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federal rules necessary for a complete presentation of Florida law.' 4
Because, as will be shown later, the Florida and federal law of search
and seizure are almost identical, Florida and federal cases will be used
interchangeably in support of some of the general statements made
herein.
The warrant
Except in certain extraordinary situations,' 5 a warrant must be sworn
out before a citizen or his possessions may be legally searched.' 6  This
warrant and the supporting oath'7 must conform strictly to all statutory
and constitutional provisions as to particularity of pcrson(s) or place(s)
to be searched' 8 and object(s) to be seized."'
The oath supporting the warrant must be basad on probable cause.
20
Since probable cause is not only a prcrcquisitc for the issuance of a
valid warrant, but is also one of the factors which, under some circum-
stances, may justify a search without a warrant, -'I some definition of this
term is needed. A thorough and comprehensive attempt at such a
definition by the Florida Supreme Court is found in Dunnavant v. State:2-
I I . A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. The courts in determination of the existence of
14. Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 51-52, 94 So. 339, 332 (1922)("Whatever
other state courts may do, the Supreme Court of Florida will guard and protect the
constitutional rights, privileges and immunities of the people as sacredly as the federal
courts."). This aim as well as the oft-noted (e.g., Church v. State. 151 Fla. 24, 9
So.2d 164 (1942); Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934)) similarity
of language between the Florida and federal constitutional provisions (see notes 11
and 12 supra) have resulted in great weight being given to federal interpretations of
the guarantee. See note 90 infra.
15. See note 60 infra.
16. Except for those instances cited in note 60 infra, all searches without
warrant arc considered unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. See notes 11
and 12 supra.
17. A comprehensive survey of what is required in the oath and warrant, and
reproductions of oaths and warrants which have Ieen held constitutional may be found
in "A Brief on Searches and Seizures, Probable Cause, and Arrests," prepared by the
Attorney General's Office, Tallahassee, pp. 2-10.
18. Bonner v. State, 80 So.2d 683, 684 (Fla. 1955)(". . (A)ny designation
or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others and leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the requirement.").
Although the officer should include the names of the owners of the property,
if such persons are unknown, he may so state. Harvey v. Drake, 40 So.2d 2 14(Fla.
1949); Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So.2d 164 (1942).
However, where a certain Freddie Jenkins lived in a room in the home of a
third party, a description authorizing the search of "the dwelling house of Freddie
Jenkins" was held insufficient due to the failure to mention the third party. Jackson
v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924).
19. E.g., Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927); Jackson v. State,
87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924).
20. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
21. See notes 82 and 83 infra and the related text.
22. 46 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1950).
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probable cause are not concerned with the question of guilt or
innocence of the accused but whether or not the affiant has
reasonable grounds for his belief.23
There need be no relation between the amount of evidence necessary
to constitute probable cause and that amount required to convict.24
However, even though all that is needed is evidence sufficient to convince
a reasonable and prudent man that the offense has been committed,25
mere suspicion does not constitute probable cause.
28
An interesting problem regarding probable cause was recently settled
by the Florida Supreme Court when, in Perez v. State,27 it was held that
evidence which was not of such quality as to render it competent in a
trial could be the basis for the affidavit supporting a search warrant.28 By
holding that the evidentary value of the supporting evidence was not a
criterion of the sufficiency of such information, this decision seems to
settle a problem which has existed in Florida courts since the United
States Supreme Court ruling in Grau v. United States.29
Search without warrant
(1) Waiver and consent. Since these rights are personal, they may
be waived.3  A voluntary consent 3  or an invitation to search, 32 whether
23. Id. at 874.
24. United States v. McGuire, 300 Fed. 98, 102 (N.DN.Y. 1924) (" 'Beyond
a reasonable doubt' must include 'probable cause.' But 'probable cause' does not include
or measure tip to satisfaction 'beyond a reasonable doubt' ".
25. Averill v. State, 52 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1951); DeLancy v. City of Miami, 43
So.2d 856 (Fla. 1950).
26. Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952).
27. Case No. 26,508, Florida Supreme Court, September 21, 1955.
28. This amounted to a repudiation of the statements made by the court in
Borrego v. State, 62 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1952); and, DeLancy v. City of Miami, 43 So.2d
856 (Fla. 1950).
29. 287 U.S. 124 (1932). That portion of the Crau case which dealt with
the competency of evidence supporting the oath was overruled in Brinnegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). In the Perez case, the court noted that, though the
Brinnegar case was decided before the Borrego and DeLaney cases (see supra note
28), the Grau case was followed since the Brinnegar case was not mentioned to the
court. The implication seems to be that the rule of the Perez ease would have been
law several years ago had the Brinnegar case been cited earlier.
30. Escobio v. State, 64 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1953). See also those cases cited in
notes 31 through 34 infra.
31. James v. State, 80 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1955); Simring v. State, 77 So.2d 833
(Fla. 1955). Of course, the consent must be voluntary. Thus, where officer entered
a room and brandished guns, the search was held invalid even though defendant made
no objection. Boynton v. State, 64 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1953).
32. Cant v. State, 114 Fla. 23, 152 So. 710 (1934). However, inviting an
officer to enter after he has knocked on the door does not constitute an invitation
to search. Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So, 329 (1922).
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express or implied,33 by the accused or by some proper party,3 4 will serve
to validate an otherwise illegal search:,
(2) Search incidental to arrest. When a valid legal arrest38 is effected,
a search incidental to that arrest may be madc.aY Since a warrant is not
necessary ini many types of arrests, 38 this rule also permits certain searches
without warrant.a3 Although the courts have had a great deal of difficulty
in attempting to define the limits of the term "incidental to arrest,"'40 it
is generally agreed that the driver and his automobile are within the scope
of this doctrine.4' However, a recent Florida case held that the search of
the trunk of an automobile is not appropriately incidental to arrest;12 the
effect and weight of this holding on the general rule will be discussed
later.' 3
(3) Where circumstances preclude obtaining a warrant. This is the
final exception to the general rule, is relatively new, 44 and, therefore, some-
what difficult to define. The great majority of cases in which it has been
applied have dealt with the search and seizure of automobiles.' 5 For this
reason, this exception will be considered at greater length in the following
section.
Consequences of an illegal search
(1) Exclusion of evidence. Today, authority is divided as to the ad-
missibility of evidence procured by illegal search and seizure.40  Florida,
33. Carlton v. State, III Ha. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933).
34. Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937) (Father could
permit officers to search his son's room when the son lived in the father's house).
A wife does not have the inherent right to waive the rights of the husband.
However, when the husband had permitted a search and the next day the wife
allowed another officer to search, the second search was held to be valid. Carlton v.
State, 111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933).
35. E.g., Carlton v. State, III Fla. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933); Chandler v. State,
93 Fla. 1063, 113 So. 91 (1927). For a collection of such Cases, see CORNELIUS, oP,. cit.
supra note 2, at 69-79.
36. 1 ALEXANDER, TIE LAW OF ARREsr 345-518 (1949).
37. E.g., Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (FPa. 1953); Rodriguez v. State, 58 So.2d
164 (Fla. 1952); Mixon v. State, 54 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1951). See also id. at 578-83.
38. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1953). See also ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 36,
at 519-23.
39. FLA. STAT. §§ 901.15, 901.21 (1953). See also Burnside v. State, 55 So.2d
107 (Fla. 1951); Diaz v. State, 43 So.2d 13 (FIa, 1949).
40. For a collection and discussion of some of the cases attempting to define
this term, see Ramsey, Acquisition of Evidence by Search and Seizure, 47 Mien. L. REv.,
1137, 1143-56 (1948-49).
41. E.g., Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952); Graham v. State, 60 So.2d
186 (Fla. 1952); Burley v. State, 59 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1952).
42. Conrington v. State, 74 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
43. See pp. 67, 68 infra.
44. This exception was announced just three decades ago in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
45. However, this rule could be applied to any mobile instrumentality. E.g.,
State v. Kinnear, 162 Wash. 214, 298 Pac. 449 (1931)(Search of an airplane without
warrant but based on probable cause).
46. For a complete analysis of all state jurisdictions on this issue, see the appendix
to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1948).
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adopting the federal "exclusion" rule, 47 forbids the admission of such
evidence.46  However, many states4" and most common law countries0
adopt the so-called "historical" view and permit the use of illegally seized
evidence if it is relevant and pertinent.P'
(2) Other consequences. Even in those jurisdictions which permit
the use of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure, the affected
party is still not remediless.12 Damages may be recovered from the search-
ing officer in an action of trespassY 3  Many states and federal statutes
have provided various other remedies to persons injured as a result of a
violation of this right.54
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has presented the basic structure of the law
of search and seizure. The application of these general rules to searches
of automobiles will be considered in the next section.
SEARCH OF AUTOMOBILES
The rules governing the search of automobiles and the seizure of their
contents present an exception to the general rules of search and seizure.
This exception has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court,""
47. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This rule has been adopted
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e).
48. Atz v. Andrews, 84 la. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922).
49. E.g., Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923); People v. Mayer,
188 Calif. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922): State v. Black, 5 N.J. Misc. 48, 135 AtlI. 685
(1926).
50. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1948). But see Cowen, The Admissi-
bility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal Searches in British Commonwealth Nations,
5 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1951-52).
51. Perhaps the most comprehensive work presenting and analyzing the various
positions of all jurisdictions is a (soon to published) treatise entitled "Search and
Seizure in Florida. What Shall be Done With Illegally Acquired Evidence?" This
study of the problem was prepared for the Dade County Grand Jury in 1954 by Richard
A. Hausler, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Miami.
52. All jurisdictions recognize the right to sue for injuries resulting from an
illegal search and seizure. Numerous cases are collected in 1 CORNELIUS, CO:S'rFITUTIOyAL
LIITATIoNs 638-87 (8th ed., Carrington 1926). Sec also note 8 supra.
53. E.g., Bull v. Armstrong, 48 So.2d 467 (Ala. 1950); Walker v. Graham, 228
Ala. 574, 154 So. 806 (1934); Young v. Western & A. R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148
S.E. 414 (1929); Ingraham v. Blevins, 236 Ky. 505, 33 S.W.2d 357 (1930).
54. A federal statute makes it a crime for a federal officer to exceed his
authority in executing a warrant (18 U.SC. § 2234 (1952)), to procure a warrant
maliciously (18 U.S.C. § 2235 (1952)), or, under some circumstances, to search
without a warrant (18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1952)).
Damages for the loss of an auto illegally seized are recoverable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. (DeBonis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 123 (D.C.W.D. Pa.
1952)). Punitive damages may be allowed where entry was made maliciously or in
wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights. (e.g., Weaver v. Ficke, 174 Ky. 432, 192
S.W. 515 (1917)). A criminal action for contempt may lie. (State v. Frye, 58 Ariz.
409, 120 P.2d 793 (1942)).
See also FLA. STAT. §§ 933.16, 933.17 (1953).
55. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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the Florida Supreme Court," and by the Florida legislature. 7  As was
stated by Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the much noted and oft-cited Carroll
case:
58
. . * (T)he guaranty from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the 4th amendment has been construed . . as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling or other
structure . . . and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automo-
bile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant before the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.,"
Hence, thoroughly convinced of the existence of some difference in the
law of search and seizure as applied to automobiles, the courts have been
(and are now in the process of) defining and delimiting this difference.
General rules
A warrant is necessary in all searches except where waived or where inci-
dental to arrest or, in some situations, where circumstances preclude the
obtaining of a warrant.60 Obviously, if a valid warrant has been sworn out,
the named automobile driver may be stopped, searched, and contraband
seized. 61 Equally apparent is the invalidity of a search founded on the
mere suspicion or caprice of the searching officer."2  However, many situa-
tions are not susceptible to such simple classification. It is these cases in
the "grey" area with which we will be concerned herein.
Automobile search without warrant
(1) Incidental to arrest. The application of the doctrine of "search
incidental to arrest" to eases of automobile search and seizure is sanctioned
by Florida case"" and statutory"4 law. Hence, arrest for any violation of
the law permits the arresting officer to search both the arrested party and
the automobile driven at the time of the arrest.05
56. E.g., Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953); Brown v. State, 46 So.2d 479
(Fla. 1950); Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So.2d 818 (1946).
57. FLA. STAT. § 933.19 (1953). This statute adopts the decision of the
Carroll case verbatim, reprinting that decision in its text.
58. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
59. Id. at 153.
60. "No search or seizure is permissible under the law without a proper warrant
duly issued, except as . . . may be allowed by law as an incident to a lawful arrest."
Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 355, 359, 91 So. 376, 378 (1921). Collins v. State, 65 So.2d
61 (Fla. 1953), presents a discussion of the origin and development of the rule
permitting search without warrant in certain cases where circumstances preclude the
obtaining of a warrant. Waiver and consent, as exceptions to the general rule
requiring a warrant, are discussed at pp. 57, 58 supra.
61. Such searches arc expressly permitted by both the Florida and federal
constitutions. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
62. Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952); Kersey v. State, 58 So.Zd 155
(Fla. 1952).
63. E.g., Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (FIa. 1953).
64. FLA. STAT. § 901.21 (1953).
65. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953); Italiano v. State, 141 Fla. 249,
193 So. 48 (1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 640 (1940).
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However, the violation must be real and not merely a device to pro-
vide an excuse for an otherwise illegal search."" A technical violation of
the law is not sufficient reason to stop and search a driver and his vehicle.C
7
To be valid, the search must be made after the arrest is cffected.' 8
An illegal search, void ab initio, cannot be made legal by the fruits it
produces. 9 Thus, where an officer stopped defendant's car, inspected his
license, flashed a light in the back seat and lifted up a package therein
which revealed contraband, and then arrested the defendant, it was held
that, since there had been no arrest at the time the search started (i.e.,
when the officer picked up the package), the search was illegal.',
There is no absolute test as to the validity of a particular search.7 '
Florida courts have repeatedly held that the validity of a search depends
on its surrounding circumstances.7 2 However, due to the high value and
basic nature of the rights herein discussed,7 S the courts have invalidated
almost every infringement whether attempted through legislative 7 or other
means."1
A corrollary to the "search incidental to arrest" doctrine is the "naked
eye" exception. This situation arises when an officer is in a place where
he has a right to be and, before he acts, he sees evidence of a crime which
has been or is being committed. He may then arrest the suspect, seize
the evidence and search incidental to the arrest.76
Typical of this type of case was Fletcher v. State.7  There, officers
who had been observing the defendant (a legal activity which did not
66. E.g., Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953)(crossing the highway center
line three times); Graham v. State, 60 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1952)(crossing the center line);
Burley v. State, 59 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1952) (passing on a curve).
67. Byrd v. State, 80 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1955).
68. Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952).
69. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953); Brown v. State, 62 So.2d 348
(Fla. 1952); Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952).
70. Kraemer v. State, see note 69 supra.
71. Italiano v. State, 141 Fla. 249, 193 So. 48 (1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
640 (1940); Thurman v. State, 116 Fia. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934); llaile v. Gardner,
82 Fla. 355, 91 So. 376 (1921).
72. Ibid.
73. The court has, by dicta, repeatedly stressed this proposition. E.g., Brown v.
State, 62 So.2d 348, 49 (Fla. 1952) ("The prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure is rooted deep in our legal and political heritage ..... There is nothing
so shocking or humiliating to one as having an officer abruptly take charge of his
effects and proceed to explore them without any semblance of authority tinder law
or permission from the owner to do so.").
74. E.g., Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934) (declaring
unconstitutional § 7664 COMp. GEN. LAws (1927)); Yaeger v. State, 78 Flu. 354, 83
So. 525 (1919) (declaring unconstitutional Laws of Fla., c. 4584 (1897)).
75. See note 113 supra.
76. E.g., Peterson v. United States, 297 Fed, 1,000 (9th Cir. 1924); Common-
wealth v. Warner, 198 Ky. 784, 250 SW. 86 (1923); State v. Quinn, 11 S.C. 174,
97 S.E 62 (1918).
77. 65 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1953).
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violate the defendant's rights) 78 approached his car. Before arresting the
defendant or ordering him from his car and without touching the defendant
or his car, they saw papers in the back seat of the car and in the defendant's
pocket which they recognized as contraband. The arrest, search and
seizure that followed were held to be valid.79
It is interesting to note the manner in which the Florida Supreme
Court distinguished this case from Graham v. State. 0 In the latter case,
though the contraband was visible, defendant's automobile had been
stopped for an alleged traffic violation. Since the search was based on the
arrest for the traffic violation and the court found that no traffic violation
had been committed, the arrest and all the proceedings that followed were
ruled invalid.
(2) Search based on probable cause. Admitting the impossibility and
impracticability of securing a warrant to search all moving vehicles, the
Florida courts have adopted the doctrine of the Carroll case.8 '
This decision stated, "In cases where seizure is impossible except
without a warrant, the seizing officer acts at his own peril unless he can
show the court probable cause."82  The use of "probable cause" as the
criterion for determining the validity of automobile searches without war-
rant was reaffirmed in Husty v. United States."8
The Carroll case is the law in Florida. 4 In addition to the "probable
cause" test enunciated there, Florida courts have adopted two other
standards: "reasonable belief"85 and "trustworthy information."80  In all
three instances, the officer arresting without a warrant must be prepared
to convince the court that he possessed sufficient information upon which
to base a warrant had lie applied for one.87
Conclusion
Thus, we see that a warrant is still necessary in most cases of automo-
bile search and seizure. In addition to the well established exceptions
permitting search without a warrant, the automobile has given rise to only
one innovation: search without warrant based on probable cause. However,
by demanding that the officer have information which could have been the
basis for the issuance of a warrant, the courts have limited the weight and
force of this exception and have protected a very basic right.
78. Id. at 846.
79. It appears that this case does not actually constitute another exception to
the general law. Since observation is not held to be a search, all that follows the
initial observation would be properly classified as search incidental to arrest.
80. 60 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1952).
81. Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132 (1925).
82. Id. at 156. (emphasis added)
83. 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
84. See notes 56 and 57 sijira.
85. Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So.2d 818 (1946).
86. Brown v. State, 62 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1952).
87. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1953).
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OBSERVATIONS
1. Generally. Any observation of the law of search and seizure must
be made with an awareness of all of the problems involved. It is far the
easier task to criticize the judiciary for its apparent tendency towards
indecision, hazy rulings and vacillation, than to realize the dilemma which
faces the courts each time they are forced to rule on a questioned search.
Duty bound to uphold the constitutions of both the United States and
Florida, 8 as well as to affirm proper convictions of lower courts, the Florida
Supreme Court is often forced to make "hairline" rulings as to whether
a constitutional guarantee has been violated-a ruling which could free
an individual who has been otherwise proven and adjudged guilty.
The observer must also consider the practical aspects of the problem:
reluctance to hinder law enforcement officers with technicalities; hesitancy
to return proven criminals to society; and, probably above all, a desire to
punish those who have broken the law. These practical considerations
must be weighed with the policy considerations which resulted in the
passage of the Fourth Amendment and Section 22 of the Florida Constitu-
tion's Declaration of Rights: the privacy of an individual and the sanctity
of his home and possessions are basic and fundamental rights.89
2. Florida law and the weight of authority. The Florida courts have
repeatedly followed the federal view on questions concerning search and
seizure; 99 with few exceptions, this represents the majority view.91 Most
noteworthy of these exceptions seem to be Florida's adoption of the "exclu-
sion" rule,9 2 and the ruling that a pursued's state of mind determines
whether or not a search has started."a Hence the observations made herein
of the Florida law are, in almost all cases, applicable to the federal law
and the law of a large majority of state jurisdictions.
3. The relation of policy to practice. The following discussion will
attempt to demonstrate certain shortcomings in the application of the
law of search and seizure. It will attempt to show how specific policies
88. FLA. CoNrsT. Art. XVI, § 2.
89. In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
at 478, Justice Brandeis mentions, as some of the forces behind this guarantee,
, .. the recognition of man's spiritual nature, . . . the right to be left alone . . .
protection from unjustifiable intrusion ....
For a more detailed treatment of the causes and motivating forces behind such
rights, see any of the works cited in note 2 supra
90. It seems that there is no place in this area of the law where the federal
and Florida courts are not in harmony. The aim of the court stated in note 14 supra
seems to have been realized. A few examples of the innumerable Florida. cases relying
in whole or part on federal cases are Perez v. State, Case No. 26,508, Florida Supreme
Court, September 21, 1955; Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (la. 1953); l)iaz v, State,
43 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1949).
91. See CORNELUS, op. cit. supra note 2; Machen, op. cit. su/ira note 2.
92. See notes 47 and 48 su/ra.
93. By holding that the state of mind of the pursued governs the time a search
starts (Mitchell v. State, 60 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1952)),, the court directly opposes the
"Mississippi" view. See Ford v. City of Jackson, 153 Miss. 616, 121 So. 278 (1929).
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created the need for and caused the formulation of certain rules; and, how
those rules have been subsequently applied without proper regard for the
original motivating policies which justify their very existence.
The federal Bill of Rights and the Florida Declaration of Rights
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures."4 Searches based on properly
executed warrants arc permitted under these provisions 5, as are certain
exceptional types of searches without warrant 90 Realizing the force and
weight of this basic guarantee, it should be obvious that those searches
without warrant which are permitted must be justified by some policy
which outweighs the policy prohibiting almost all searches without warrant.
It is submitted that, though such a consideration was present when those
exceptions were formulated, they arc, in many instances, applied today
without regard to such consideration. Furthermore, when a policy justifies
and creates a rule, and that rule is subsequently applied without regard to
that policy, such application is unfounded and illogical-perhaps even un-
constitutional.
For example, consider the proposition that a search incidental to a
valid arrest is constitutional even though effected without a warrant., 7
Thc policy behind this rule is twofold: (1) the likelihood that the ar-
rested party is armed; and, (2) the prospect of the suspect destroying the
fruits of the crime which iay well be in his possession at the time of the
arrest. "' Because of this rationale, an exception was made to the general
rule requiring search warrants. Applied to numerous cases of arrest, this
exception seems both necessary and desirable. However, is it necessary and
desirable when the arrest is for the commission of a traffic violation?0"
The accused, arrested for such a violation, sits in his car while the
arresting officer inspects both his person and vehicle100 Obviously, there
are no fruits of the crime (i.e., the traffic violation) which the accused could
destroy; and, since the accused is in the front seat of the car, the existence
of a weapon in the back seat seems immaterial here. Also, common sense
dictates that the possibility of the suspect being armed becomes quite
remote when the offense is a mere traffic violation.1Oi
94. See notes II and 12 supra.
95. Ibid.
96. See note 60 supra.
97. F.LA Sr^,r. §§ 901.15, 901.21 (1953). See also Mixon v. State, 54 So 2d 190
(Fla. 1951); Diaz v. State, 43 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1949).
98. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). For an account of the
development of this theory, see United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 77-79
(1950) (Dissent).
99. Such procedure is sanctioned by FLA. STAT. § 901.21 (1953).
100. E.g., Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952).
101. '[his conclusion becomes more obvious when it is realized that "any traffic
violation" could include such offenses as driving with a defective headlight, double
parking, possibly cven an overdue inspection sticker.
COMMENTS
And yet, federal and Florida courts indiscriminately apply the search
incidental to arrest doctrine to such cases, apparently oblivious to the
complete lack of logical foundation of such application.
1 2
Another example defying basic principles of logic may be found by
examining the very basis for the exceptional status of the automobile, and
comparing that basis with subsequent decision. Since it is often impractical
to secure a warrant for the search of a moving vehicle, an automobile may
be searched without a warrant if that search is based on probable cause. 03
Yet, despite this sound basis for this exception to the general rule requir-
ing search warrants, Florida and federal courts have held that a search
without warrant but based on probable cause was valid even though there
was sufficient time and opportunity in which to secure a warrant.0 4 Though
a recent Florida case expressed a contrary point of view, 10 this rule seems
to be the accepted Florida and federal view.
Finally, let us examine the necessity for a relation between the offense
which was the basis of the arrest, and the offense of which defendant is
finally convicted. The logic mentioned above would demand such a rela-
tion. 00 However, though the Florida courts have refused to decide this
question, 107 it is probable that they will concur with the majority of juris-
dictions 108 and declare such a relation to be unnecessary.OD
Thus, we find that rules founded on sound logic and theory are often
applied where that logic and theory are not applicable. We see that the
policy motivating certain rules is often ignored, which has resulted in those
rules changing from well-founded, flexible tools of justice to unfounded, in-
exorable weapons of conviction. These conclusions cast serious doubts on
the reasoning employed by the courts in many of their decisions.
4. Bases of decision. Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
is a basic right; it is onc of the essential safeguards of a free people." 0 It
appears that the courts are hesitant to give sufficient weight to this right.
Few decisions arc based primarily on the right to be free from unreasonable
102. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 77-79 (1950)(Dissent).
103. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
104. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Brown v. State 46 So.2d
479 (Fla. 1950).
105. Courington v. State, 74 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
106. If a search incidental to arrest but without warrant is permitted due to
certain policy considerations, can such a search be justified when it does not further
these policies? See notes 94 through 102 supra and the related text.
107. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61, 63 (Fla. 1953).
108. E.g., Smith v. State, 215 Ind, 629, 21 N.E. 2d 709 (1939); Ginter v.
Commonwealth, 262 SV.2d 178 (Ky. 1953); Williams v. State, 216 Miss. 158,
61 So.2d 793 (1951); King v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 404, 121 P.2d 1017 (1942); State
v. McKindel, 148 Wash. 237, 238 Pac. 593 (1928).
109. It seems that, if the court believed such a relation to be necessary, ILA. STAT.
§ 901.21 (1953) would have been declared unconstitutional or the cases cited in note
67 supra would have been decided on that basis.
110. See notes 14 and 73 supra.
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searches and seizures. Rathcr, the court seems prone to debate, at great
length, the existence of a traffic violation, the validity of an arrest, when
a search starts, or similar factors which, though relevant, should be secondary
in importance to a right so fundamental 1
Although any of these factors might be used in determining the legality
of a search, no one or combination of these factors is the basis of the right;
they are no more than mere aids to be used in defining this basic right. It
appears that, oftimes, the court's major concern is with such artifices which,
though providing a convenient and expedient basis for decision, avoid con-
tact with the basic issue.112
The results of the court ought not to be criticized. They have been
both equitably and legally sound and the rights guaranteed have been more
than adequately protected.113 However, it is urged that the logic and rea-
soning of the court be sharpened and strengthened. As they exist today,
laws prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure, though vigorously en-
forced, are weak and ill-defined. flis situation will exist as long as this
right is defined in terms of theories which mention the constitution, but
are not dependent upon this supreme law for their validity.
The special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Barns in the recent Florida
case of Ippolito v. State"4 illustrates the method of decision which seems
more desirable in cases of questioned searches and seizures. In one succinct
paragraph, this opinion simply and accurately held that, since no warrant
had issued and probable cause had not been shown, the questioned search
was invalid."'' The majority opinion, in order to reach the same result,
found it necessary to spend almost three pages discussing arrest, traffic laws
and numerous other facts unrelated to the real issue.'' 6
The bases of decision discussed and criticized above should be avoided
for numerous reasons, two of which are made obvious by the foregoing
discussion. First, the basic doctrines sought to be protected are weakened
due to the confusion and lack of definition which result; and, second, such
bases cause the creation of bogs of dicta which stifle the basic law and,
after fermenting for a suitable period of time, are sometimes mistaken for
and quoted as venerable and aged declarations of law.
111. The type of decision here criticized is illustrated by those cases cited in
note 67 supra. The court seems at no loss for words when, in paragraphs of dicta,
the force and weight of this right are discussed (see notes 14 and 73 su pra). However,
dictum is not decision nor can it greatly help in the solution of the problem herein
discussed.
112. E.g., see notes 114 through 116 infra and the related text.
113. Over two-thirds of the searcbs reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court in
the last five year period were held unconstitutional. A listing of all of these rulings
would serve no useful purpose here; suffice it to say that, if there was any reason
for declaring a search to be unreasonable, the conviction appealed from was reversed.
114. 80 So 2d 332 (Fla. 1955).
115. Id. at 334.
116. Id. at 332-34.
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5. Trends. Though the logic and theory employed by the court might
be susceptible to criticism, the resulting decisions have been almost com-
pletely consistent. Only one case, Courington v. State,117 seems sufficiently
inconsistent with the general patterns of the law to be considered a possible
trend.
In this case, the defendant was convicted of the unlawful possession
of gambling implements. Vital evidence was obtained from a search of
the trunk of the defendant's car after he was arrested for driving while
intoxicated. This search was held to be unconstitutional and the convic-
tion was reversed. The decision118 was based on the following rationale:
We think that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the
search of the trunk of appellant's car was not appropriately incident
to making a lawful arrest for driving while intoxicated. Our view
is bolstered by the testimony of the deputy which indicates that
the search of the trunk would not have been made but for the state-
ments of witnesses relating to appellants putting some papers in
the trunk.
In so ruling, it ought well be added that the facts and circum-
stances here reveal that it was not impractical or impossible for
the officer to obtain a search warrant if he obtained sufficient in-
formation to justify the issuance of one." 9
By its holding, this opinion adopts a rule which is contrary to the
majority and federal view.1 20 By strong dicta, this opinion attempts to reverse
a rule which is well settled Florida and federal law.' 21. And both these
ends are sought to be achieved without the use of one supporting case or
authority. The blistering dissent, 22 substantiated by past decisions and
impressive authority, seems to be more indicative of what the Florida law is.
Although the majority recognizes the individual's right and protects it
with sound logic, the result seems to lead the law further into confusion
and to further confound the sincere law enforcement officer. Since there
have been no subsequent cases on the rules involved in this decision, and,
since the court refrained from specifically reversing any of the existing rul-
ings in conflict with this decision, it is impossible to ascertain the future
weight and effect of the Courington case. However, in view of past stability
and consistency, it does seem unlikely that the court will depart from the
117. 74 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
118. Delivered by Milledge, AJ., JJ Terrell, Thomas, Mathews and Hobson
concurred.
119. Courington v. State, 74 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954). With the exception of a
brief statement of the facts and the issue, the above is the complete majority opinion.
120. See note 108 supra.
121. See note 104 supra.
122. Courington v. State, 74 So.2d 652, 54-56 (Fla. 1954) (The dissenting
Justice was Roberts, C.J.).
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strong and widely acccpted majority view to adopt a minority "Florida"
view.
CONCLUSION
A problem does exist in this area of the law. The guilty must be
apprehended and convicted, but such convictions must not be made at the
expense of constitutionally guaranteed rights.' 2 :  There is no panacean
solution to this problem. An awareness of its existence coupled with care-
ful and thoughtful action by law enforcement officers would be the first step
towards an answer. Were the Supreme Court to offer more preciscly de-
fined rules, and were the various law enforcement agencies to educate their
officers as to the existence and content of these rules, perhaps compliance
with the constitutional limitations on search and seizure would be more
readily forthcoming.
It should be the aim of courts, cfforcencnt agencies, and enforccmcnt
officers to change the now existent mass of principles and ill-defined rules
into a practical and functional code which will serve to convict the guilty
without the inequity of an incidental violation of anyone's constitutional
rights.
RICHARD H. PARKER
123. "Therefore, we must consider two obiects of desire, both of which we cannot
have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should
be detected . . . . It is also desirable that the government should not itself foster
and pay for other crioes, when they are the means by which evidence is to be
obtained." Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
